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We analyze the following questions associated with flexible outsourcing under partly 
imperfect dual domestic labour markets, where high skilled workers participate in firm’s 
profit via profit sharing: How does the implementation of profit sharing influence flexible 
outsourcing? What is the relationship between outsourcing cost, profit sharing and wages? 
We show that profit sharing has a positive effect on low skilled wage and thus an outsourcing 
enhancing character. The wages of both types of labour are negatively correlated and lower 
outsourcing cost can increase the wage dispersion by decreasing the low skilled wage and 
raising the high skilled wage. The overall effect of profit sharing on high skilled wage is 
ambiguous due to a positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect via the low skilled 
wage. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
              
In an integrated world, marginal cost differences are the driving force for the 
reallocation of production parts (offshoring) and for the make-or-buy-decision 
(outsourcing). Especially for western European countries, the wage and labour cost 
differences constitute the central explanation for the increasing business practice of 
offshoring and international outsourcing to eastern European or Asian countries.
1 
Reasons for the wage gaps are, among others, differences in labour market institutions 
and in the process of wage determination. In most western European countries, wages 
are determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations and trade 
unions. In eastern European or Asian countries, however, unions are much weaker so 
that wages are determined by market forces. Typically low-skilled workers in western 
Europe are unionized so that labour unions are able to push for their relatively high 
wages at the cost of a higher unemployment in continental Europe than in the United 
States (see e.g. Freeman and Schettkat (2001)). In opposite to the low skilled, wages of 
skilled workers are mostly determined competitively.
2  
Since western European firms have the opportunity to buy foreign intermediate 
goods after knowing the domestic wage levels and so the marginal production cost, this 
will affect the domestic wage formation process for both types of workers. The threat of 
flexible outsourcing as a reaction to high domestic marginal production cost will 
dampen the opportunity of the trade union to realize a high wage level for the low 
skilled. To induce them to abstain from external procurement of intermediate goods, 
western European firms need lower marginal cost. Since both, wages for skilled and 
unskilled, affect the marginal production cost, there are two components to reduce 
marginal cost. If lower wages are not possible, firms have to raise their productivity. 
                                                 
1   See Amiti and Wei (2005) and Rishi and Saxena (2004), which emphasize the big difference in 
labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing 
and services to countries with low labour costs. 
2       There are some papers that analyze the effects of outsourcing when labour is heterogeneous, like   
Davidson et al. (2007) and Davidson et al. (2008). However, these papers concentrate on labour 
market frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labour unions in the case of 
unskilled wage formation.   3
One channel to increase productivity is to stimulate workers’ effort. The firm may 
introduce a profit sharing scheme that lets workers participate in the firm’s success. The 
implementation of profit sharing will induce incentives to increase effort and thus 
productivity for given wage levels. Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an 
important phenomenon in many OECD countries. Pendleton et al. (2001) have 
presented detailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 OECD countries.
3 However, 
only high skilled workers, such as managers, often realize profit sharing as a part of 
their income. So they participate in the firm’s success, which is positively influenced by 
their effort. But profit sharing will also affect wage formation for low and high skilled 
workers. Since a part of the wage income can be substituted by profit income, profit 
sharing can probably affect the base wage for the high skilled workers. Although higher 
effort of skilled workers provides higher productivity and thus raises the firm’s profit, 
which opens the opportunity for the trade union to pick up a higher share of this profit 
by demanding a higher wage for low skilled workers. However, this dampens the 
advantage of domestic production and increases outsourcing activities. As profit 
sharing is now commonly incorporated in the compensation schemes and international 
outsourcing has recently increased, e.g. in western EU-countries and in the United 
States, it is important to study the implications of profit sharing and wage bargaining on 
flexible outsourcing in a partly dual labour market. 
Concerning the analysis of the effects of outsourcing on compensation schemes 
under wage bargaining, there are two focuses in the literature, the case of committed 
and flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case outsourcing takes place before 
wage bargaining
4, in the flexible case outsourcing is decided after wage bargaining. 
Our focus in this paper is to assume that outsourcing is flexible, i.e. determined 
                                                 
3         See also Conyon and Freeman (2001). 
4    See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage 
bargaining. Also e.g. Danthine and Hunt (1994) and Zhao (1998, 2001) have studied the effects of 
international outsourcing and foreign direct investment on wage formation in the home country. 
They showed that higher product market integration implies intensified product market 
competition, which moderates wage increases in unionized labour markets. Skaksen and Sorensen 
(2001) have studied the effects of trade unions on firms’ foreign direct investments, which are 
made prior to the stage of the wage bargaining. Lommerud et al. (2006, 2009) have presented a 
theoretical model with monopolistic and oligopolistic competition to determine how unionization 
affects the fraction of outsourced inputs.    4
simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but after wage formation for low skilled 
workers. To our knowledge, the first one, who studied the effects of flexible 
outsourcing on wage setting, is Skaksen (2004).
5 Also, Braun and Scheffel (2007b) 
have developed a simple two-stage game between a monopoly union and a firm by 
assuming that the labour union sets wages before the firm decides on the degree of 
outsourcing. But in these papers they have abstracted from the analysis of profit sharing 
as a part of the compensation scheme or heterogeneity of labour force, which is our 
focus.
6 Concerning the wage effect of profit sharing, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) 
have studied the differences between committed and flexible profit sharing, but both in 
the absence of outsourcing and heterogeneous labour market.  
An analysis on the interaction of different profit sharing schemes and 
outsourcing, in strategic (committed) and flexible case, is done by Koskela and König 
(2008a, 2008b). However they also focus on homogenous labour force. We extend their 
work by allowing for two types of workers
7 in dual labour markets by providing 
answers to the following question: How does the implementation of profit sharing for 
high skilled workers influence outsourcing activities? By analyzing our main question, 
we thus also find answers to: How do the opportunity of flexible outsourcing and its 
cost influence the wage for both types of workers and profit sharing? And, what is the 
relationship between profit sharing and wage levels? We analyze these questions in a 
partial equilibrium model in which we assume a time sequence of the profit sharing 
decision, where firms commit to profit sharing before the base wage formation.  
                                                 
5      He has analyzed the implications of outsourcing, in terms of both potential (non-realized) and 
realized international outsourcing, for wage setting and employment under imperfectly 
competitive labour markets.  
6   There are also some new analyses, which incorporated flexible outsourcing and wage bargaining, 
e.g. Koskela and Poutvaara (2008b), Koskela and Schöb (2008) or Koskela (2008). But the main 
focuses in these papers are labour taxation issues in the absence of profit sharing and in Koskela 
and Schöb (2008) and Koskela (2008) also in the absence of worker heterogeneity. 
7      Koskela and Stenbacka (2007)  analyze strategic outsourcing in a dual labour market in the 
presence of wage solidarity by the labour union. Analyzing strategic outsourcing in a dual labour 
market is also done by Koskela and Poutvaara (2008a), but they are interested in taxation effects 
in the absence of profit sharing. For an introduction into the debate on dual labour markets, see 
Saint-Paul (1996). His focus is on dual labour market with identical workers by looking on the 
dynamic efficiency wage models, but there is also a part with heterogeneous workers. However, 
this research is also in the absence of both outsourcing and profit sharing.    5
We find that in this case, the wage of the high skilled will be negatively affected 
by the wage of the low skilled. For the effect of implementing committed profit sharing 
we show, that it will have a direct effect on the skilled wage, which has a 
supplementary character, but a negative indirect effect via the effect on the wage for the 
low skilled worker. Thus the overall effect on high skilled wage is ambiguous. Since 
the firm is flexible to decide about the amount of outsourcing after decisions are made 
concerning wage negotiation for the low skilled and profit sharing for the high skilled, 
these income parts are influenced by outsourcing costs. We find that in this case lower 
outsourcing cost leads to falling wages for the low skilled. Since the high skilled wage 
does not directly depend on outsourcing cost, thus the high skilled wage is only affected 
indirectly via low skilled wage. Here, lower outsourcing cost will increase the high 
skilled wage and will thus raise the wage dispersion. Given that outsourcing demand is 
only affected by the relation of low skilled worker wage and outsourcing cost, profit 
sharing will have an enhancing indirect effect on outsourcing activities.  
Due to globalization and the increasing opportunity of outsourcing existing jobs 
can be eliminated.
8 We try to give an answer to: Is profit sharing to high skilled 
workers while unions bargaining over low skilled wage an instrument that can avoid 
outsourcing and secure existent jobs. If the answer is “yes” and politicians are 
interested in job security, they should set any incentives to the firm to implement a 
profit sharing scheme for high skills. In the opposite case, the incentives should be cut 
profit sharing schemes for high skills. With our result we can also give a suggestion if 
politicians have two aims: job security for low skills and decreasing wage dispersion. In 
this case we would conclude that policy should, again, set incentive to prevent profit 
sharing for high skills and uses its power to increase the cost of outsourcing.  
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of theoretical 
framework and two different time sequences in terms of profit sharing decision. Labour 
demand, outsourcing and employee effort and skilled wage formation are presented in 
Section III. Section IV investigates the low skilled wage formation by monopoly labour 
union with committed profit sharing. Finally, we present conclusions in section V. 
                                                 
8         From the efficiency point of view that may be preferable, politicians may be interested to save 
these existent jobs due to market intervention.        6
 
 
II.  Basic Framework 
 
 
We analyze a model with heterogeneous domestic workers, i.e. dual domestic 
labour market, flexible international outsourcing and committed profit sharing. The 
production combines labour services by effective skilled workers and unskilled 
workers. Effective skilled employment is a combination of absolute skilled employment 
and the effort by skilled workers, i.e. their productivity. Following empirical studies, 
we assume that low skilled workers and outsourcing activities are substitutes, so that 
unskilled labour services can be provided either by the firm’s own workers, or obtained 
from abroad through international outsourcing. We assume that the firm may be 
flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity after the wage for 
low skilled worker is set by the labour union. The analyzed timing decision is 
summarized in Figure 1. The timing structure captures the idea that the representative 
firm decides profit sharing before the monopoly trade union sets the unskilled wage.   
 
 
Figure 1:  time sequences of decision  
 
Flexible outsourcing and committed profit sharing 
 
                stage 1              stage 2                            stage 3                                                                     




               profit           unskilled wage            skilled and unskilled labour demand, 
   sharing        by labour union         outsourcing, skilled labour supply                                              
                                                           and skilled wage and effort  
                                                                       determination by skilled worker  
 
In this timing structure profit sharing is assumed to be committed at stage 1 and 
at stage 2 conditional on profit sharing, the labour union determines the wage for the   7
unskilled workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for labour and 
outsourcing by the firms. We assume that there are many industries, so that each labour 
union represents only a small fraction of the total labour force. At stage 3, firms decide 
on domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wage of the skilled labour 
adjusts to equalize labour demand and labour supply and, moreover, the representative 
skilled worker decides on effort provision. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by 
using backward induction.  
 
 
III.  Labour Demand, Outsourcing Decision,  Employee Effort and 
Skilled Wage Formation 
 
III.1.   Labour Demand and Outsourcing 
 
At the last stage, the representative skilled worker decides on the effort e and 
the representative firm decides on the skilled labour demand H , the unskilled labour 
demand  L, and outsourcing M . The firm decides domestic labour demand and 
outsourcing to maximize the profit function 
 
()
() ( ) M g L w H w M L eH F Max L H
M L H
− − − = , ,
, ,
π 3 2 1                                                     (1)  
 
by taking the skilled worker’s effort, e, the negotiated unskilled and skilled wages,  L w  
and  H w , as well as profit sharing, τ , as given. In order to obtain M  units of 
outsourced unskilled labour input, we assume that firms also have to spend 
()
2 5 , 0 cM M g =  with  () 0 ' > = cM M g  and  ( ) 0 ' ' > = c M g . This increasing marginal 
cost of outsourcing captures the idea that there are some other costs associated with 
outsourcing as the price for the intermediate goods. Such cost could be communication 
cost or cost for quality proofing. 
In case of our production function, we partly follow Koskela and Stenbacka 
(2007) by assuming a general and reasonable Cobb-Douglas-type production function   8
with decreasing returns to scale according to three labour inputs, i.e. 
() ( ) ( ) []
ρ a a M L eH M L eH F
− + =
1 , , , where the parameters ρ  and a are assumed to 
satisfy the assumption:  1 ; 0 < < a ρ . From (1) we can derive the marginal products of 
skilled  labour,  unskilled labour and outsourcing:  ()
a a a
H M L H ae Y F
− − − + =
1 1 1 ρ ρ  and 
() ( ) M
a a a
L F M L a H e Y F = + − =
− − 1
1 ρ ρ , with  ( ) ( )
a a M L eH Y
− + =
1 . The outsourced 
unskilled labour input affects the marginal products of the domestic skilled and 
unskilled labour inputs as follows:  
 
() ( ) 0 1
1 1 2 > + − =
− − − a a a
HM M L a H ae Y F
ρ ρ   
and    
() ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 1 1
1 1 < − − + − − =
+
− − −
43 42 1 a M L a eH Y F
a a
LM ρ ρ
ρ .  
Taking these, we can conclude that for our type of production function the domestic 
skilled labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input are complements, 
whereas the unskilled domestic labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input 
are substitutes in terms of the marginal product effects of outsourcing.
9 Also, one can 
calculate from the production function that the domestic skilled and unskilled labour 
are complements, i.e.  ( )( ) 0 1
1 1 2 > + − =
− − − a a a
HL M L a H ae Y F
ρ ρ . Using the marginal 
products we can calculate the first-order conditions characterizing the domestic skilled 
and unskilled labour demand and outsourcing activities 
     
0 = − = H H w F
H
a ρ







= L L w F
M L
a ρ
π                                                                             (2b) 
 
                                                 
9         Ethier (2005) has introduced a partly related production function to analyze the decision between 
international outsourcing and in-house production for analyzing the effect of globalization on the 
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These first-order conditions (2a) and (2b) imply the relationship between the skilled 
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L = ,                                                                                 (4) 
 
where  1 =
M
w M L wL , and  1 = −
M
c Mc . According to equation (4) higher unskilled 
domestic wage rate and lower outsourcing cost will increase outsourcing.    
Substituting the RHS of (3) into (2b) gives the unskilled labour demand, which 
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1 > − = − − ρ ρ ρ ρ




















, with δ as the own 
wage elasticity and ε  as the cross wage elasticity in the absence of outsourcing. 
According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the unskilled 
labour demand,  which shows again the substitutability of low skilled labour and 
international outsourcing, which is consistent with empirical evidence. As we can see, 
higher own wage and cross wage and lower high skilled effort will affect negatively the 
unskilled labour demand. In the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticities of the   10
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,  and the effort elasticity of 
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Of course, in the absence of outsourcing both the wage and effort elasticities are 
constant and smaller, i.e.  δ η =
=0 M L  and  ε η η = =
= = 0 0 M e M H .  

































e H  so that when outsourcing will increase, the own wage 
and cross wage elasticities of the unskilled labour demand increase. These are also in 
conformity with empirical evidence. The effects of outsourcing cost on the own wage 
and the cross wage elasticity of unskilled labour are  
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η                                       (7b) 
 
so that lower outsourcing cost will increase the wage elasticities of domestic unskilled 
labour demand.
10  
                                                 
10       See e.g. Hasan et al. (2007), Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2006), who have provided empirical 
evidence according to which international trade has increased the wage elasticity of low-skilled 
labour demand.    11
Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (5) into the relationship in equation (3) 
gives the following labour demand for the representative skilled worker  
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. These elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale, 
but unlike in the case with unskilled labour, both the own wage and cross wage labor 
demand elasticities and the effort elasticity for the skilled labour are independent of 
outsourcing. As for unskilled demand, higher own wage, cross wage and the lower 
effort will of course affect negatively the skilled labour demand.  
We can now summarize our findings of an asymmetry in how the demands for 
skilled and unskilled labour react to the cost of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing  
(a) the own wage, the cross wage and the effort elasticity for the unskilled 
labour demand depend negatively on the cost of outsourcing, and 
positively on the amount of outsourcing, whereas   
(b) the own wage, the cross wage and the effort elasticity for the skilled 
labour demand are independent of the cost of outsourcing.   
 
 
III.2.   Wage Formation for Skilled Workers  
 
III.2.1 Optimal Labour Supply and Effort Determination of Skilled Workers 
 
We assume that the market equilibrium for the skilled wage  H w  follows from 
the equality of labour demand and the labour supply. The high skilled labour supply is   12
assumed to be constant, i.e.  μ =
s H .
11 Taking this assumption into account, we derive 
the high skilled wage from market equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage  L w  as 
given.              
The effort determination of the skilled worker is assumed to be determined as 
follows:  The effort provision of the skilled worker is associated with a disutility, which 
is assumed to satisfy the function  ( )
γ γ
/ 1 e e h =  with  1 0 < <γ  so that it is convex,   
() () 0 '
1 / 1 > =
− γ e e h () ( ) [] ( ) 0 1 / 1 ' '
2 / 1 > − =
− γ γ e e h . Under constant labour supply the overall 
utility only depends on the profit income and the disutility of effort as the difference 
between profit income and the sum of disutility of effort  () e h H S ⋅ − τπ = . We assume 
identical high skilled worker, so that the individual utility function for the employed 
high skilled worker in terms of profit sharing, firm’s profit and disutility of effort can 







τ = = ,                                                               (9) 
 
where τ is profit sharing and π  the representative firm’s profit. Equation (9) shows that 
every skilled worker gets the same per capita profit income, but he/she realizes the 
individual disutility for providing a certain effort level. The optimal individual provided 
effort level results from individual utility maximization of (9) with respect to effort, 
which yields the first-order condition 
 
() 0 ' = − = e h
H
U e e π
τ
.                                                           (10) 
 
Using   () 0 '
1 / 1 > =
− γ e e h  calculating  H e / π , equation (10) implies (see Appendix B) 
                                                 
11    A central finding in the empirical labour market literature is that low skilled labour supply tends to 
be quite unresponsive along the intensive margin. See for empirical evidence, e.g. Immervoll et al. 
(2007) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). To provide a relative simple model, we adopt this 
strong assumption for high skilled labour supply. However, our main result does not change if we 
assume a more realistic assumption like complete elastic of high skilled labour supply. See also 
conclusion.   13
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e H wH = =
τ
γ
τ  is the elasticity of the 
representative skilled worker’s effort with respect to profit sharing and the skilled 
wage.
12 Therefore, the optimal effort by the representative skilled worker is influenced 












e , so that both the base 
wage and profit sharing enhance the productivity by increasing effort provision and 
positively affect labour demand indirectly.
13 But outsourcing will have no direct effect 
in case of perfect substitutability between outsourcing and domestic unskilled labour.  
 
III.2.2 Market Equilibrium for Skilled Wage Formation   
 
Unlike in the case of unskilled workers, we assume that the skilled wage  H w  is 
determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the labour demand 
function and the labour supply function. In the case of our constant labour supply, 
μ =
s H , the equality 
s H H =  gives  ()() μ
ε δ ε =
−














































X  and  ()
γ τ H w K e = , we 
can rewrite it explicitly as follows 
 
                                                 
12   The case of zero effort elasticity describes a firm, where individual worker has no influence on the 
firm’s profit. Thus she/he has no incentive to increase effort and will provide only a minimum 
effort level of one. By implementing profit sharing the firm distributes only a part of its profit to 
the worker without effects on effort or profit. So it is beneficial for the firm to avoid profit sharing. 
In this scenario the optimal profit share will be zero (see Koskela and König (2008a, b)). Since we 
are analyzing the effect of implementing profit sharing we assume positive effort elasticity. 
13        This finding lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson 
(1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Kruse (1992) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990)). Also in the 
theoretical focus of the literature we find evidence of increasing effort by higher wages, see e.g. 
Lin et al. (2002).   14
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K X Z . Knowing this, we can look on comparative statics of 
H w  in terms of  L w : 
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Equation (13) lies in conformity with empirics concerning the negative relationship 
between skilled and unskilled wages in the presence of outsourcing.
14  














H H w w
.                                                    (14)    
 
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the skilled wage 
determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 2: In the presence of flexible outsourcing   
                                                 
14      See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel 
(2007a), Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Haskel and Slaughter (2001), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hijzen 
(2007), Egger and Egger (2006), Munch and Skaksen (2005), Riley and Young (2007) and 
Geishecker and Görg (2008).   15
(a) the skilled wage depends negatively on the unskilled wage and positively 
in a direct way on profit sharing, and   
      (b)  the skilled wage is also directly independent of the cost of outsourcing, but 
depends on the unskilled wage, so that higher outsourcing cost affects 
indirectly, whereas  
(c) the skilled effort depends positively both on the skilled wage and profit 
sharing. 
 
These results are intuitively in our setting. Since high and low skilled labour are 
complements, a higher low skilled wage will reduce both labour demands. Thus, in the 
competitive wage formation for high skilled labour the lower labour demand for given 
labour supply will induce a smaller high skilled wage, ceteris paribus. The positive 
direct effect of profit sharing can be explained as follows. Higher profit sharing will 
increase the effort, which leads for given wage level to a higher productivity. This 
increases labour demand and results in a higher wage for given labour supply.  
 
 
IV.  Unskilled Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union under 
Committed Profit Sharing 
 
 
Now we analyze the wage formation of unskilled workers, which takes place in 
anticipation of optimal labour and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We analyze the 
wage formation by the monopoly labour union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), 
p. 401-403 concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines the wage 
for unskilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house unskilled labour demand in 
the presence of flexible outsourcing and of market equilibrium for the high-skilled 
wage  H w .
15   
 
                                                 
15   In Western European countries, which we like to focus on, labour market institutions are close to 
this (see e.g. Freeman (2008)).  
   16
IV.1.   Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union under Committed Profit 
Sharing  
 
The objective function of the labour union of unskilled workers is assumed to be 
() N b L b w V L L L + − = , where  L b  is the (exogenous) outside option available for the 
unskilled workers and N  is the number of labour union members. The monopoly 
labour union sets wage for the unskilled workers so as to  maximize the surplus 
according to  
 
{ ( ) N b L b w V L L L
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L H Zw w  (see equation 
(12)).  
The first-order condition associated with (15) is  
 







































= . Plug in the labour demand reaction in equation (16), we  













































V . Simplifying this 
expression leads to    
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   17
where  ()































⎛ + = 1 . These unskilled labour demand elasticities are not constant 
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ε ε δ , depends negatively on 
the skilled wage and the unskilled wage but positively on the skilled worker’s effort 
and the cost of outsourcing. 
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so that the total wage elasticity, also allowing for the relationship between skilled and 
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e w mw L
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ε ε δ . It is important to emphasize that the 
optimal unskilled wage (18), even in the case of the monopoly labour union, is an 















 depends on the unskilled wage rate in a non-linear way so 
that it cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic unskilled wage. In the 





M A . 
In order to answer our research question and characterize the effect of 
outsourcing cost on the unskilled wage formation, we therefore apply the implicit   18
differentiation. Differentiating the wage formation (18) with respect to the unskilled 













































































,                        
















































= ,  and calculating     
 
() () 0 1 1
) (



















c c L β β
η                                  (19a)   
 
and   
 








































γ ε δ β η
                              (19b) 
 
(see Appendix D) the relationship between the unskilled wage formation and 






























,                                              (20) 
 
so that lower (higher) outsourcing cost will decrease (increase) the wage of unskilled 
domestic workers.     19
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (18) with respect to the profit 
















































































− .                    































1 1  with 



































































,                                              (21) 
 
so that profit sharing for skilled workers will have a positive effect on the domestic 
unskilled wage.  
Knowing this, we are able to find an answer to our main question: How does the 
implementation of profit sharing for high skilled workers influence outsourcing 








dM L                                                                    (22) 
 
so that the effect of outsourcing activities is driven by the effect on low skilled wage, 
which is positive.   20
We can now summarize our findings with answering: How does the 
implementation of profit sharing for skilled workers in the presence of outsourcing 
affect the low skilled workers’ wage and outsourcing? 
 
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
(a) higher profit sharing for the skilled worker has a positive effect on the 
wage for the unskilled labor and  
(b) higher profit sharing for the skilled worker has an enhancing effect on 
outsourcing, whereas 
(c) lower cost of outsourcing decreases the wage for the unskilled labour. 
 
Higher profit sharing increases the skilled labour demand and since the labour inputs 
have assumed to be complements, also the low skilled labour demand raises. Thus, a 
higher low skilled wage will have a smaller loss for the trade union via less dismissal 
and the union can set a higher wage. Since higher profit sharing increases the firm’s 
profit, the trade union gets a higher share of this due to higher low skilled wages. But 
the wage enhancing effect will also induce a higher outsourcing demand, which can be 
explained by the substitutability of domestic low skilled labour services and foreign 
intermediate goods,  which also determines the positive  correlation of domestic low 
skilled wage and outsourcing cost. Lower outsourcing cost means for given wage level 
a higher outsourcing demand and more elastic domestic wage elasticity (see equation 
(19a), which lies in conformity with empirics). Thus the opportunity for the trade union 
to set higher wages falls. To avoid outsourcing and make integrated production more 
attractive, the trade union reacts with a decreasing low skilled wage. 
However, up to now we have only analyzed the direct effect of profit sharing 
and outsourcing cost on the wage for high skilled worker. Using the above results, we 
can show the overall effects of outsourcing cost and implementing profit sharing for the 
high skilled wage. Using equations (20), and (21) jointly with equations (13) and (14),   21
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Following from this, lower cost of outsourcing will raise the domestic skilled wage and 
decrease the unskilled wage and thus lead to higher wage gap. 
In line with earlier research on homogenous labour force and empirical studies, 
we also find an ambiguous effect of profit sharing on the domestic skilled wage, so that 
profit sharing could have a supplementary or complementary character for the base 
wage.
16 
We can summarize our findings in 
 
Proposition 4: In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
(a) lower cost of outsourcing, by decreasing the wage for the unskilled   
labour and increasing the wage for the skilled labour, induces higher 
wage dispersion, whereas  
(b) higher profit sharing for the skilled worker can have a supplementary or 
compensatory character for the skilled labour.     
 
Due to the substitutability of international outsourcing and domestic low skilled labour 
services, lower outsourcing cost increases labour demand elasticity and decreases the 
domestic low skilled wage so that the low skilled labour demand rises. Since low 
skilled and high skilled labour are complements, also the high skilled labour demand 
increases so that for given high skilled labour supply, the high skilled wage increases, 
thereby inducing higher wage dispersion, which lies in conformity with empirics.  
                                                 
16   For theoretical analysis in the case of homogeneous labour see Koskela and König (2008b). There 
is also some empirical evidence for both properties. Black and Lynch (2004) show by using U.S. 
data, that profit sharing results in lower regular pay for workers, which implies a compensatory 
character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by using UK data and also in Kraft and Ugarkovic 
(2005) by using German panel data, it has been shown that introducing profit sharing does not 
reduce the wage, which implies a supplementary character. See also the book by Ugarkovic 
(2008).   22
As we showed, implementing profit sharing affects high skilled wage positively 
in a direct way. But there is also an indirect channel due to the complementary 
relationship of labour inputs. Since higher profit sharing induces higher low skilled 
wage, this will reduce the labour demand for both types. This leads by assuming a 
competitively wage formation for high skilled worker to a lower skilled wage. Thus, 
there are two opposed effects: the wage increasing direct effect, which describes the 
higher skilled labour demand due to higher effort and profit, and the wage decreasing 





V.       Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have tried to describe a more realistic framework of flexible 
outsourcing in a partly unionized dual labour market by using reasonable assumptions. 
In western European countries we often observe that unlike low skilled workers, which 
are organized in trade union, high skilled wages are mostly determined competitively. 
However, high skilled workers could, unlike the low skilled labour force, directly 
participate in the firm’s success via profit sharing. But this will affect the wage 
determination of both types of labour and affect the outsourcing demand. Thereby, we 
answer the following questions: First, how does the implementation of profit sharing 
for high skilled workers influence outsourcing activities? Second, how does the 
opportunity of flexible outsourcing and its cost influence the wage for both types of 
workers and profit sharing? And third, what is the relationship between profit sharing 
and wage levels? 
In the above analyses we could show that the wage of the high skilled workers 
will be negatively affected by the wage of the low skilled. The overall effect of 
implementing committed profit sharing on high skilled wage is ambiguous, since on 
                                                 
17      For giving a policy statement as a support for the aim of securing existent jobs, we can also sum 
up the following: Without profit sharing to high skilled there is no wage increasing effect for 
unionized low skills, what avoid outsourcing. Job security plus decreasing wage dispersion can 
occur, if the policy can also increase the cost of outsourcing. 
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one side there is a wage increasing direct effect, such that profit sharing has a 
supplementary character, but on the other side there is a negative indirect effect via the 
wage for the low skilled worker. We also show that lower outsourcing cost leads to 
falling wages for the low skilled. However, the high skilled wage does not directly 
depend on outsourcing cost. Also, here there is only an indirect effect via low skilled 
wage working. Our analysis shows that lower outsourcing cost will at the same time 
decrease the low skilled wage and increase the high skilled wage and thus raise the 
wage dispersion. Also, we could conclude that the effect of profit sharing on 
outsourcing activities is indirect via the effect on low skilled wage and ambiguous. This 
follows since outsourcing demand is only affected by the relation of low skilled worker 
wage and outsourcing cost, where profit sharing affects the low skilled wage.  
Of course, in our analysis we have the assumption of a constant labour supply of 
high skills. If we relax this assumption by using the concept of perfect mobile high 
skills we get an elastic high skilled labour supply, but anymore, high skilled labour 
demand would be positively affected by effort. Therefore, implementing profit sharing 
scheme increase high skilled employment and due to the complementary relationship of 
labour types, this would raise the opportunity for the labour union to realize a higher 
low skill wage and increase outsourcing. So the qualitative result is the same. 
As analyzed in the literature, also a flexible profit sharing system could be 
implemented. Since here the profit share and the wage for high skilled worker would be 
decided after the wage negotiation for the low skilled, there is no effect of 
implementing such a system on low skilled wage and thus on outsourcing demand. 
However, similar to the argumentation of Koskela and König (2008b), it can be shown 
that in the presence of outsourcing such a profit sharing system provides a lower profit 
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Appendix A: Optimal Unskilled Labour Demand 
 
Substituting the RHS of (3) for H  into (2b) gives  
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give (5). QED. 
 
Appendix B: Optimal Skilled Employee Effort   27
 
The first-order condition in terms of effort determination from (9) is                   
() 0 ' = − = e h
H
U e e π
τ
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where   () () ( ) 1 1 1 1 = − + − − − ρ ε ρ ε a a ,  ( )( ) ( ) 0 1 1 1 = − − − − − ρ δ ρ δ a a  and  
 
() ( ) () [] 1 1 1 1 1 − = − + − + − − ρ ε ρ ε δ γ a a . By substituting these into (B2) gives equation 
(11). QED. 
 
Appendix C: Optimal Unskilled Wage Setting   
The first-order condition associated with { ( )L b w V L L
L w
− = max  s.t.  0 = L π  and  μ = H   
can be written as follows   
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, which all together implies equation (18) 




































Appendix D: Effects on Low Skilled Wage 
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